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Desperation May Affect Autonomy
but Not Informed Consent
Teresa Swift, University of Bristol
Dunn and colleagues (2011) provide an interesting analy-
sis of the ethical issues involved in deep brain stimulation
(DBS)forpeoplewithtreatment-resistantdepression(TRD).
I agree with the conclusions the authors draw regarding
TRD patients’ capacity to consent but would like to take up
theauthors’callforgreaterexaminationofthewayinwhich
desperation may affect patients’ decision making about re-
search participation. I propose that desperation affects not
capacity to consent but voluntariness and that any attempts
to explore desperation should reﬂect this.
In the context of informed consent, voluntariness is
legally deﬁned in relation to external constraints imposed
by others, in forms such as coercion, undue inﬂuence, force,
or fraud (see, e.g., Jackson 2009). Other accounts of volun-
tariness, however, acknowledge the role of circumstances.
Roberts (2003) has previously argued that illness-related
factors and psychological issues, among other things, may
affect the voluntariness of decisions. Likewise, Nelson and
Merz(2002)notethatthreatstovoluntarinesscanarisefrom
potential participants’ vulnerabilities, while Hewlett (1996)
speciﬁcally criticizes the informed consent model for fail-
ing to address the inﬂuence of circumstances on consent to
clinicalresearchparticipation.Patientcircumstancesmayof
course include the nature of their illness and any feelings
of desperation that their condition creates. These accounts
are supported by a deﬁnition of voluntariness provided by
Olsaretti (1998). Olsaretti makes a distinction between free
choices and voluntary choices, arguing that they are not
necessarily related but are often confused with one another.
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Choices should be termed free if they are not subject to the
inﬂuences of other people. Choices are nonvoluntary, how-
ever, if they are made because no other option is acceptable
to a person in terms of that person’s well-being other than
the option ultimately chosen. Choices are voluntary when
there is an acceptable alternative or when, even if there is
no acceptable alternative, the only option available is cho-
sen because the agent likes it and would choose it even if
another acceptable option also existed. Olsaretti gives an
example of nonvoluntariness, as follows:
Daisy lives in a city surrounded by desert. She desires to leave,
but knows she would not survive the journey through the
sands, and therefore chooses to stay. Daisy is free to leave—
nobody prevents her—but she acts non-voluntarily, since
she stays only because all other possibilities would be fatal.
(Olsaretti 2004, 138–139)
If we apply this notion of voluntariness to the health
care context, it may be the case that a patient can only
make a voluntary choice to participate in research if more
than one acceptable option is available to her. Otherwise,
as Hewlett notes, her choice is merely theoretical. Thus, if
the choice a desperate patient faces is between undergoing
an experimental treatment, or declining and accepting the
lack of effective standard treatment for her, the decision to
enrol in a trial may seem the only acceptable option. The
decision may be a competent one, fully informed and even
free, but it may not be voluntary. Dunn and colleagues
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consider whether desperate patients lack genuine au-
tonomy in some way, even if they cannot be presumed
to lack decision-making capacity; Olsaretti’s notion of
voluntariness appears to provide an explanation of the
speciﬁc way in which the desperate patient’s autonomy
may be impaired without implicating capacity.
In order to address concerns about desperation, how-
ever, Dunn and colleagues propose the use of instruments
assessing patients’ attitudes to research and its risks and
beneﬁts in order to strengthen the process of informed
consent. If such an instrument is to tap into the concept of
desperation, the crucial question to ask potential research
participants, based on the account of voluntariness just
given, is whether they feel they have any acceptable
alternative other than to say yes to entering a trial when it
is offered, and whether they would have declined the trial
offer if such an alternative had existed.
If Olsaretti’s deﬁnition of voluntariness is accepted,
however,theabilityofthedesperatepatienttogiveconsent,
as it is presently deﬁned, may not technically be affected,
eventhoughthevoluntarinessoftheperson’sdecisionmak-
ing might be. There is also the question of what action
recruitingresearchersshouldtakeinlightoftheinformation
gathered from such an instrument. Dunn and colleagues
propose a more thorough consent process, which is always
to be commended. However, while detailed attention to
the information and comprehension aspects of informed
consent may indeed help to correct misperceptions or mis-
placed expectations, this process is unlikely to be able to as-
suage the desperation that may drive a patient to undergo
an experimental intervention even when fully and accu-
rately informed about signiﬁcant risks and uncertain bene-
ﬁtsandinpossessionofthecognitivecapacitytomakesuch
adecision.Agrawal(2003)statesthatitisimportanttochar-
acterize ethical concerns correctly in order to apply the ap-
propriate safeguards. For desperate patients, as with other
vulnerable individuals, if a particular aspect of autonomy
cannot be enhanced at the consent level (and is not even in-
corporatedintotheconsentconceptinthecaseofOlsaretti’s
deﬁnition of voluntariness), the key safeguard may lie at a
differentstageoftheresearchprocess.Agrawalbelievesthat
vulnerability is more useful as a term if one deﬁnes what a
person is vulnerable to. In the case of a research trial, certain
patients may be vulnerable to exploitation, i.e., vulnerable to
accepting an unfair distribution of the risks and beneﬁts of
theresearch.Potentiallyexploitativeoffersshouldofcourse
be addressed by the ethical researcher at the trial design
stage, but the appropriate safeguard against exploitation,
Agrawal argues, is ethics committee review to ensure that
anypatientinvitedintoatrialisofferedafairbalanceofrisks
and potential beneﬁts if the person participates. This is not
simply a matter of equipoise but also of providing a “fair
deal” within each trial group (since two trial groups may
be equally “unfair” and still satisfy equipoise). Even the
desperate patient who ﬁnds a trial offer irresistible should
not, therefore, be faced with a poor risk/potential bene-
ﬁt ratio that exploits that person’s desperation. As Resnik
(2002)argues,“Thereisnothinginherentlywrongwithcon-
ductingresearchonsubjectsthatsufferfrom.. .misfortunes
or vulnerabilities, provided, of course, that one does not
take unfair advantage of those subjects” (2002, 29). Resnik’s
conclusion accommodates Dunn and colleagues’ legitimate
concerns that to exclude desperate patients from research is
to ignore the ethical principle of justice.
Insummary,Iarguethatwhiletherelationshipbetween
TRD and consent may be explicated in terms of capacity,
desperation may have its effect on voluntariness (as de-
ﬁned by Olsaretti) rather than on capacity and that its effect
may be difﬁcult to ameliorate through informed consent
measures. Since my commentary is also a theoretical ex-
ploration of the issue, I support Dunn and colleagues’ call
for more empirical research into the relationship between
desperation, autonomy, and research participation. 
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